Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic

Logic isn't special. Its theories are continuous with science; its method continuous with scientific method. Logic isn't a priori, nor are its truths analytic truths. Logical theories are revisable, and if they are revised, they are revised on the same grounds as scientific theories.

These are the tenets of anti-exceptionalism about logic. The position was first suggested by W. V. Quine, and has more recently been defended by Timothy Williamson. Their efforts have mainly been to argue against exceptionalism, in particular that logic is a priori. In contrast, this project aims to develop a positive programme for anti-exceptionalism. This involves providing a non-apriori epistemology for logic that is continuous with other sciences. We work on the assumption, therefore, that theory selection in logic will be a matter of abduction, i.e. inference to the best explanation.

There are four key challenges to anti-exceptionalism that the project will answer. First, we will articulate precise abductive criteria for theory selection. Second, we will classify and assess logical theories based on the abductive strategy. In particular, we argue that the abductive strategy favours nonclassical logic. Third, we will identify empirical presuppositions of exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism, in order to see whether they are confirmed by the findings of experimental data in the psychology of reasoning. The hypothesis is that the aprioricity thesis is unsupported by the data. Fourth, we will argue that anti-exceptionalism is compatible with logic being normative.