Silje A. Langvatn er førsteamanuensis i vitskapsteori ved Senter for vitskapsteori (SVT). Ho har tidlegare hatt stilling som postdoktor ved SVT, postdoktor og forskar ved PluriCourts, Universitetet i Oslo, Law & Philosophy Fellow ved Yale Law School (2016) og Visiting Fellow ved Harvard Government Department (2009).

• Arrangør av workshopen New Perspectives on Legitimacy, University of Leiden, Leiden, 30 okt og 1 nov. 2024
• Gjesteforelesing, "What is it we disagree about when we disagree about the legitimacy of an institution?" Political Science Department, Trinity College, 4. oktober 2024
• Arrangør av workshop om proporsjonalitetsvurderingar i samarbeid med PluriCourts. Bergen, 6. og 7. juli 2023
• Innlegg: Academic freedom imaginaries, under SVT sitt jubileumsseminar: Akademisk fridom ved 35. Bergen, 23.09.2022
• Medarrangør og bidragsytar til workshop: Proporsjonalitetsvurderingar - korleis og kvifor? Arrangert i samarbeid med Eirik Holmøyvik med støtte frå PluriCourts (UiO) og Juridisk fakultet (UiB). Bergen, 10.05.2022
• Innlegg på SVT sitt symposium Sick Society: What makes corona measures justifiable? Bergen, 03.12.2021
• Mens Høyesterett grubler: Her er en guide til debattene i klimasøksmålets kjølvann. Saka nemner bl.a. debatten Langvatn og Sunde sette i gang i Klassekampen om klimarettsaka i Høgsterett. 3.12.2020
•  

Emneansvarlig VITHF900 Vitenskapsteori og Etikk for PhD-kandidatar ved Humanistisk Fakultet og Griegakademiet

Forelesingar på VITSV900 Vitenskapsteori og Etikk for PhD-kandidatar ved Samfunnsvitenskapelig fakultet

Forelesingar på MNF490 Vitenskapsteori for PhD-kandidatar ved MatNat-fakultetet

Nyaste publikasjonar

Langvatn, S.A. & Holst, C. (2026) Science advice for policy: enhancing the legitimacy of non-epistemic value judgments through proportionality analysis, European Journal for Philosophy of Science,16 (35), 1-35. 

Science advice bodies increasingly shape public policy. Yet, their analyses and recommendations routinely involve non-epistemic value judgments that sit uneasily with ideals of democracy and separation of powers. We argue that in liberal constitutional democracies the political legitimacy of such judgments can be enhanced by integrating structured proportionality analysis into the workflow of policy-recommending advisory bodies. This deliberative procedure – first developed by constitutional courts – brings attention to policies’ impact on protected rights and amounts to a multi-pronged scrutiny of the justifiability of a policy which infringe on rights. We show, first, that existing guidelines for science advice bodies nationally and in international organizations implicitly acknowledge non-epistemic judgments but under-specify how to deal with them. Second, recent philosophy of science rightly foregrounds the democratic scrutiny of values (and so representation, alignment, and participation) but underemphasizes rights-based constraints. Our proposal reorients advisory practice toward rights-sensitive, deliberative justification that science advice bodies can apply ex ante—where these bodies often possess superior expertise on relevant aspects such as the suitability and necessity of a policy. Embedding proportionality analysis both mid-stream (to shape option generation) and in public justifications (to enable contestation and deliberation across branches and publics) improves transparency, mitigates overreach, and aligns advice with the rule-of-law and rights commitments of liberal democracies. The final part discusses scope conditions, institutional implications and limitations of our proposal. Structured proportionality analysis does not guarantee optimal outcomes, but supplies a stable, recognized method to discipline non-epistemic judgments and thereby enhance the legitimacy of science-based policy advice.

Langvatn, S.A. (2025) What Is It We Disagree about When We Disagree about the Legitimacy of an Institution? A Framework for Analyzing Legitimacy’s Institutional-Context Sensitivity Ethics & International Affairs, 38(4):479-508. 

This article aims to explain the protean nature of the concept of “legitimacy,” arguing that its variability largely stems from denoting a quality of institutions that is both internally complex and sensitive to variations in institutional context. While this institutional-context sensitivity often leads to confusion and miscommunication, it is also what centers the concept’s meaning and use. To better understand legitimacy’s different forms of institutional-context sensitivity, and how they are interconnected, the article shifts from analysis and comparisons of concepts and theories of legitimacy to analysis and comparison of specific legitimacy arguments regarding specific institutions. It introduces a structured framework for analyzing legitimacy claims, beginning with the identification of the institutional level that the argument is directed at. This approach highlights how legitimacy assessments vary across higher and lower institutional levels—a crucial aspect of institutional-context sensitivity that has been underexplored in recent institutional legitimacy literature. The framework, comprising four steps of analysis and two supporting figures, advances our understanding of the complex nature of institutions’ legitimacy and underscores the importance of distinguishing between the legitimacy of an institution and the legitimacy within an institution. Throughout, the article illustrates the framework with examples drawn from scholarly debates on the legitimacy of the International Criminal Court. 

Langvatn, S.A. (2024) Political legitimacy in Rawls’ Early and Late Political Liberalism – Two Diverging Interpretations. Philosophy & Social Criticism, Vol 50 (7), 1138-1154.

This article is part of a special issue on Frank I. Michelman's recent book Constitutional Essentials (2022). It examines Michelman's interpretation of Rawls two conceptions of legitimacy –"The Liberal principle of legitimacy" and the later "Idea of political legitimacy based on the criterion of reciprocity" – and argues that Michelman's offers an interesting interpretation which suceeds in bringing out the distinctly institutional and practice-dependent nature of Rawls' way of understanding legitimacy. However, I go on to argue that Michelman's interpretation is too proceduralistic, and that it fails to grasp the most interesting developments in Rawls' latest conception of legitimacy (Rawls 1996-1997).

Langvatn, S.A. & Holst, C. (2024) Expert accountability: What does it mean, why is it challenging—and is it what we need? Constellations, 31: 98-113

When mistakes are made in political life, a standard remedy is to find someone to hold to account. But when experts who take part in governance make mistakes, they are seldom the ones who are held to account. So, is the solution to make these «unaccountable experts» more accountable? Not so quick, we argue. Case: The severe expert mistakes made in the preparation of the impact assessment report for opening the South Eastern Barents Sea for petroleum activity.